That afternoon, the 29-year-old executed air-to-ground strafe and slow-speed basic maneuvers when he is believed to have suffered a bout of gravity-induced loss of consciousness, or GLOC, a condition where a pilot goes unconscious due to a lack of blood flow to the brain, according to an internal investigation obtained by Navy Times.

Bullock was “incapacitated” when his jet quickly descended from 7,300 feet and crashed near Trona at 2:07 p.m. local time. His ejection seat was properly installed and the investigation found that Bullock did not attempt to initiate an ejection.

“Due to the relatively low altitude that this maneuver was executed, the pilot did not have enough time to regain consciousness before impacting the ground,” the investigation states.

Now, two-and-a-half years after the young aviator’s death, questions have emerged about why a system that keeps a jet airborne if a pilot loses consciousness was never installed in Navy Super Hornets, and if such a system might have prevented Bullock’s death.

The system is known as Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System, or Auto-GCAS, and it’s designed to temporarily take control of a jet for short periods of time if the pilot blacks out or gets distracted, military aviators who reviewed the Bullock investigation told Navy Times.

But for reasons the Navy has declined to explain, Auto-GCAS has not been installed in the sea service’s Super Hornet fleet.

The Air Force installed Auto-GCAS on its F-16 and F-22 fighter jets, and credits the system with saving the lives of 16 aviators since 2014.

The Marine Corps’ legacy Hornets are also slated to receive Auto-GCAS next year, according to Naval Air Forces, and the software is already installed on all F-35 jets, according to that platform’s Joint Program Office.

Despite repeated queries by Navy Times, the Navy has refused to explain why Auto-GCAS is not in Super Hornets, or whether the service believes a lack of Auto-GCAS played a role in Bullock’s death.

Auto-GCAS “remains an area that the team continually assesses during safety review boards and provides annual updates to the fleet, as safety is our number one priority,” Naval Air Forces spokesperson Cmdr. Beth Teach said in an email to Navy Times.

The Naval Safety Command, which conducts its own investigations into such mishaps, declined to say whether its investigation found a lack of Auto-GCAS to have been a factor in Bullock’s death.

While the Navy remains mum to such questions, some aviators with direct Auto-GCAS experience believe the system would have prevented Bullock’s fatal crash.

Lt. Col. Billie Flynn is a retired pilot with the Royal Canadian Air Force.

Flynn also served as a test pilot with Lockheed Martin who flew with the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force, and has tested out three different Auto-GCAS systems.

After reviewing the Bullock crash investigation, Flynn unequivocally stated that Bullock would still be alive if Auto-GCAS was installed in his aircraft.

“Auto-GCAS would have saved Lt. Bullock, period,” Flynn told Navy Times.

He isn’t the only member of the aviator community to reach that conclusion. An active duty Air Force aviator familiar with Auto-GCAS who reviewed the investigation and was granted anonymity also told Navy Times that he believes the technology would have saved Bullock’s life.

“What’s the price of a very talented young naval aviator?” Flynn said. “I would submit there is no price for that. You can’t replace Lt. Bullock, and how do you explain to his parents, his family, that you could have implemented this at some point and chose not to, because it wasn’t a value to Navy leadership. I don’t think you can answer that question.”

‘Instantaneous G’

To decrease the likelihood of suffering GLOC, pilots undergo specific centrifuge training to better equip their bodies to tolerate strong G-forces.

But pilots still carry risks with them in the cockpit, and Auto-GCAS helps mitigate that risk, according to Flynn.

“In a Super Hornet, the instantaneous G is so sudden that if you are not perfectly prepared, then your body might not be ready for the G that you’re about to experience, and that historically, has contributed to pilots blacking themselves out,” he said.

Pilots typically regain “useful consciousness” between 45-60 seconds after blacking out, according to Flynn.

Flynn said he thinks the Navy and NAVAIR understand the benefits of Auto-GCAS, but have opted to not spend the money and time installing the system in the Super Hornet fleet because “it’s never been important enough for Navy leaders.”

“Navy leadership, including the leadership at NAVAIR, have all been briefed and are keenly aware of the capabilities that Auto-GCAS brings and the potential to save aircraft and lives,” Flynn said.

Flynn added that GLOC isn’t as common now as it once was in aviators due to advancements in training and ensuring G-suits fit properly, and therefore, leadership isn’t as inclined to believe installing the technology is worth the effort.

Teach, of Naval Air Forces, told Navy Times that no other naval aviators have suffered injury or death due to GLOC-related incidents in the past five years, according to the service’s Risk Management Information mishap reporting system.

‘Max was genuine’

Assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron 113 at the time, Bullock was remembered as a young man who “packed more into 29 years than most could ever imagine.”

“When asked how he would want to be celebrated, Lt. TJ Hall, Max’s wingman, said, ‘Fast, loud and awesome!’” Bullock’s obituary states. “While he’ll be celebrated this way, he’ll be remembered as generous beyond belief, a genuine friend, passionate and relentlessly positive, and fearless.”

Bullock’s parents, Bill and Robin Bullock, said their son described himself as a “possibilitarian” who believed anything was possible, and loved his country and fellow service members deeply. They said the family honors his memory by thinking about what he would do when making choices in life now.

“Whenever we would question whether or not we should do something or to go forward with it, one of the kids, or one of the parents says, ‘You know, what would Max do?’ And the automatic answer is, he would go for it. He would try it, he would be the first one to be in line to do something, and reach out to help others,” Robin Bullock told Navy Times.

Bullock conducted a “thorough brief” prior to take off on the day of his death, outlining the training rules for basic fighter maneuvers, air-to-ground strafe and low-level training.

The investigation also found that Bullock was prepared for the mission, and that human factors did not play a role in the mishap.

It determined the aircraft safe for flight and that no malfunctions occurred, and that environmental factors such as weather did not contribute to the mishap.

The case did not warrant any disciplinary action within the squadron, and the investigation determined the squadron’s command climate didn’t factor into the mishap.

Specifically, the report said that no one interviewed for the investigation voiced knowledge of procedure violations, rule-breaking or flat-hatting by any members of the squadron — Bullock included.

Flat-hatting is the practice of conducting maneuvers at low altitude or high speed “for thrill purposes,” according to the Federal Aviation Administration.

“I have directed that the findings of this investigation will be widely shared with all units under my cognizance to underscore the unforgiving and inherently dangerous nature of naval aviation, which requires the finest sense of judgment and control,” a command endorsement of the investigation states.

Bullock’s obituary recalls him as someone who would “start every day with the intent on figuring out how to make the world a better place.”

“Max was genuine. He would strike up a conversation and build a friendship with everyone crossing his path; he would listen with interest and appreciation to any story,” Bullock’s obituary said. “He gave the gift of long-term friendship openly and without reservation.”

Then-Sgt. Maj. Charlie Clawson was charged and sentenced for wearing nine unauthorized decorations, ribbons, devices or insignia between January 2019 and October 2023, according to charge sheets obtained by Marine Corps Times.

Included in the awards and decorations Clawson deceptively sported on his uniform were the Purple Heart, awarded to those killed or wounded during military service; the Combat Action Ribbon, distributed to sailors or Marines who actively participated in ground or surface combat; and the Joint Meritorious Unit Award, authorized for those who contributed to meritorious achievement for joint activities, the charge sheets said.

Clawson also wore the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Service Medal, the Kosovo Campaign Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, the Sea Service Deployment Ribbon (with a silver and bronze device to denote seven awards), the Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon, and the Navy and Marine Corps Parachutist Insignia, the charge sheets said.

For each of these awards, Clawson also faced a charge for violating Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a general article that covers misconduct, such as indecent acts, fraternization and bigamy.

Likewise, Clawson was also charged with making a false official statement after reportedly sharing a bogus doctoral degree and transcript from Liberty University with Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs in May 2019.

The statement was “totally false, and was then known by the said Sergeant Major Clawson to be so false,” the charge sheet said.

Maj. Hector Infante, a spokesman with Marine Corps Training and Education Command at Quantico, confirmed to Marine Corps Times that a court-martial sentenced Clawson on Sept. 13 on all charges brought against him.

Military.com first reported Clawson’s reduction in rank.

Clawson, from Virginia, first enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1996 and went on to serve as a motor vehicle operator in the service, according to his service records.

The service records show Clawson is assigned to the Headquarters Battalion at Training and Education Command in Quantico. Infante confirmed to Marine Corps Times he is currently administratively assigned to the command.

Among the awards and decorations Clawson did receive are one Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, distributed to personnel who supported counterterrorism operations post 9/11; and two Sea Service Deployment Ribbons, authorized for sailors and Marines who conducted an at-sea deployment.

Capt. Zaldy Valenzuela, the CO, and Cmdr. Art Palalay, his second-in-command, were removed from their respective positions on Sunday due to a “loss of confidence in their ability to command,” according to the Navy.

Capt. Dan Lannamann, the former commanding officer of Mid-Atlantic Regional Maintenance Center in Norfolk, Virginia, is now leading the facility while Cmdr. Timothy Emge, the center’s operations officer, is filling in as executive officer until a permanent replacement is identified.

“The Navy holds commanding officers and others in authority to the highest standards,” the Navy said in a statement. “Naval leaders are entrusted with significant responsibilities to their Sailors and commands.”

The Navy rarely shares any rationale behind firing commanding officers aside from the “loss of confidence” statement, and no additional details were provided on Valenzuela and Palalay’s reliefs.

Valenzuela’s previous assignments include ship superintendent and carrier type desk officer at SRF-JRMC, electrical division officer aboard the amphibious assault ship Bonhomme Richard, and the combat and communications officer aboard the amphibious command ship Blue Ridge.

Palalay, who enlisted in the Navy in 1993 and commissioned in 2006, previously served as the readiness officer at Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific before becoming the XO of SRF-JRMC in 2023.

The maintenance center, equipped with six dry docks, conducts intermediate and depot-level maintenance and repairs for Navy ships across the 7th Fleet.

But Navy flattops have undertaken anything but regular deployments in the past year.

Other East Coast carriers have seen their deployment plans uprooted by the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, one that has repeatedly threatened to engulf the Middle East in a broader war since it began nearly a year ago.

American aircraft carriers have been at the forefront of Pentagon efforts to prevent the conflict from widening.

Fellow East Coast carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower was diverted to the Middle East last fall and spent nine months there before heading home this summer, while fellow carrier Gerald R. Ford conducted its own extended cruise in the Mediterranean Sea that ended earlier this spring.

West Coast carrier Theodore Roosevelt steamed over from the Indo-Pacific to relieve the Ike in July, and was later joined by the Abraham Lincoln.

TR departed the Middle Eastern waters of U.S. Central Command earlier this month.

So while the Navy says Truman’s deployment will be to Europe, it remains to be seen whether events in the Middle East will conform with those plans.

Ike’s deployment “highlighted the need for continuity in our sustained presence amid escalating international tensions,” Adm. Daryl Caudle, commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, said in a statement this week.

Caudle added that the Truman and its strike group “will contribute to the ongoing training and combat readiness of our naval forces.”

“The operational experience gained through these deployments is invaluable for maintaining a deep bench of skilled warfighters with trust and confidence in their system’s reliability, adaptability, and lethality in a rapidly changing security environment,” he said.

The Pentagon announced Monday plans to beef up its troop presence in the Middle East and cautioned that a wider regional conflict could emerge, following recent strikes from Israel against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

However, Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder declined to provide specifics on the troop increase.

“In light of increased tension in the Middle East and out of an abundance of caution, we are sending a small number of additional U.S. military personnel forward to augment our forces that are already in the region,” Ryder said Monday. “But for operational security reasons, I’m not going to comment on or provide specifics.”

The policy applies to officers serving in their first shore tour with a projected rotation date of October 2025 and beyond, and is being implemented due to “personnel shortages across second sea duty billets,” the Naval Air Forces document states.

“This policy increases warfighting readiness by reducing billet turnover rates at sea, and ensuring more of the Navy’s highest priority billets are filled,” the briefing states.

Naval Air Forces confirmed the authenticity of the document to Navy Times.

Roughly a quarter of unrestricted line aviators request to leave the Navy once they reach their minimum service requirement, sometimes in the midst of that second two-year sea tour — an issue the Navy attributes to extended training pipelines and first sea duty tour extensions in some instances.

While Navy Personnel Command has historically signed off on such mid-tour separation requests, Navy pilots and naval flight officers will now fulfill the entire length of a second sea tour prior to departing the service.

“Aviation [unrestricted line] communities are tasked with filling 904 second sea duty billets; current inventory and separation timing have led to approximately 19% of these billets remaining unfilled and 60-70% of these billets turning over annually resulting in decreased operational readiness in key billets,” the document states. “This has been mitigated by early departures from first shore tours, which impacts retention and is unsustainable long term.”

Most officers will be forced to stay in uniform for less than a year more under the new policy, according to Naval Air Forces spokesperson Cmdr. Beth Teach.

The policy also aims to allow more junior officers to complete their full shore-duty, rather than stepping in to fill empty at-sea billets caused by the departing aviators, she said.

“We are in a warfighting business and this is one way that we’re going to continue to increase readiness,” Teach told Navy Times. “We understand that there are concerns, and we’re communicating this more than a whole year in advance, so that people can ask questions and plan their careers. Ultimately, it reduces turnover and creates opportunity for more [junior officers] to complete their shore duty in the future.”

In a list of questions and answers included in the document, Naval Air Forces says that it is legal for the Navy to require officers to serve past their minimum service requirement to fulfill the prescribed tour length in the event of personnel shortages.

“In accordance with MILPERSMAN 1301-108, and higher-level instructions, if determined by competitive category or designator that significant personnel shortages are a compelling military necessity for retention, then an Officer may be retained until the completion of the Prescribed Tour Length written in approved orders,” the document states.

Word of the policy change spread online Tuesday, and Instagram pages dedicated to the world of junior Navy officers soon went to work with memes related to the news.

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A post shared by JOPA (@navy_jopa)

The head of naval aviation, Vice Adm. Daniel Cheever, is slated to visit several installations next month and hold all-hands calls with junior officers to discuss the policy, according to the document.

“Officers are encouraged to ask questions about this policy and its impacts to their career planning during detailing discussions, as well as with their chain of command,” it states.

Those selected for department head may wrap up their second sea tour before the prescribed length of time if the required training pipeline and planned arrival dates require it, according to the briefing.

Go here to read the full document.

Navy aviator retention rates declined in Fiscal Year 2023, with 11 out of 15 aviation communities not having enough officers to be department heads, according to the Navy’s latest Health of the Force report.

In the strike fighter community alone, roughly 25 percent of the Navy’s department head billets are unmanned, according to the report.

And while the Navy has offered big bucks to keep pilots flying Navy, the report said fewer aviators are accepting the department head retention bonuses. Currently, the Navy offers aviation department heads up to $280,000 to remain in service for seven more years.

“Naval Aviation continues to meet operational requirements,” the report states. “However, sustained support and frequent evaluation of monetary incentives are critical in our effort to retain highly trained and experienced mid- and senior-level aviators.”

The Eisenhower entered the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in November, just weeks after the start of the Israel-Hamas War. The ship’s arrival in the region marked the first time a carrier operated in those Middle Eastern waters since the end of the Afghanistan war in 2021.

While there, the strike group shot down a barrage of Iran-backed Houthi drones and missiles on a regular basis – earning the crew the Combat Action Ribbon for their actions. The carrier’s air wing also led the first strikes against Houthi facilities in Yemen in January, and employed several weapons in combat for the first time.

Capt. Chris “Chowdah” Hill, the Ike’s commanding officer, spoke to Navy Times this month aboard the Eisenhower about how the crew navigated the conflict in the Red Sea, led the international effort Operation Prosperity Guardian to safeguard civilian merchant vessels in the region and how leadership worked to maintain morale among the crew through multiple deployment extensions.

This interview was edited for length and clarity.

Navy Times: This was an historic deployment on so many fronts, and Navy leaders have described the conflict in the Red Sea as the Navy’s most kinetic conflict since World War II. So to start off, I wanted to get your perspective on what were some of the key takeaways and memorable moments for you from this deployment?

Chris Hill: I could talk about this all day. So I would characterize it overall as the most complex naval engagement for the U.S. Navy since World War II. And I’m looking back to Korea, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, Gulf War II, all that stuff – just a very busy situation in the Red Sea involving multi-domain threats on the surface, in the air, and new kinds of systems, like some of the new drones and some of the anti-ship ballistic missiles, which had never been fired in combat until this moment, and the first time they’ve been shot down, which we did.

So that was unprecedented, in that sense. We’ve overused that word on our end, but it was truly unprecedented. The admiral and I and other warfare commanders, with our combined experience, anywhere from 25 to 35 years in the Navy, we hadn’t seen anything like this, right? So the big question is, were we prepared? So that’s a question that we have to look at throughout.

But going back, for this ship, the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, it’s an older ship, going on 47 years, still fully capable. The ship did two back-to-back deployments during COVID in 2020 and 2021. A lot of sailors didn’t get to see the world, which is quintessential Navy – go visit port calls and interact with local populations. And that has a strategic impact of some sort as well.

So leading up to deployment, we are expecting to do something more akin to what we did in the 80s and 90s – some NATO engagements, lots of port calls, mainly focused in the Med. It was very exciting for sailors. We talked about it all the time. I made a lot of promises, and it all went out the window on Oct. 7. So Oct. 7 occurs, Hamas invades Israel, and we’re deploying on our normal schedule a week later on Oct. 14.

We didn’t really have a specific mission yet, because the situation was still developing, but we were given orders to…meet up with the Gerald R. Ford in the Eastern Med, which we did. While we’re en route, the USS Carney was ahead of us by about a month I think, maybe a little bit more, but they were already in the Red Sea and they happened to be in a position where they intercepted dozens of missiles and drones early on.

So that was kind of a foreshadow of what we would expect when we got there. And so we ended up going to the Red Sea, but we were just transiting through initially. Ultimately ended up in the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf to counter Iran. And then we weren’t there too long before we were directed back into the Red Sea because of the situation there where the Houthis were essentially targeting merchant vessels, making an attempt to shut down the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. So on Dec. 31, we went back into the Red Sea. We remained there for about six-and-a-half months and were engaged very frequently, both defending other ships, defending ourselves, and also bringing the fight to the enemy quite regularly.

NT: Tell me a little bit about Operation Prosperity Guardian. What was the Eisenhower’s involvement with that like? How did that effort form, and what kind of support did the Eisenhower and its strike group provide?

Hill: We were the main element of Operation Prosperity Guardian, which was designed to defend merchant vessels and that involved providing escorts and just defending ships whenever we could. Doing a wholesale escort mission in an area that is that congested is really hard for a single strike group. Having said that, we were regularly saving a lot of lives. And that was the implied mission, it wasn’t the stated mission. Stated mission was to degrade Houthi capability and also provide protection. So we did both of those simultaneously while we were out there.

NT: The last time I was on this carrier was before getting underway during Large Scale Exercise. At the time, there was a lot of talk about being in the 6th Fleet, but always being prepared for things to change. And you mentioned in your first response a little bit about how things changed after Oct. 7. Can you share what that was like, realizing that the carrier might head into the Middle East for the first time since 2021?

Hill: When we’re doing our our work ups, it ends in a capstone event called Composite Unit Training Exercise, or COMPTUEX, about five to six weeks long involving the entire strike group consisting of four destroyers, a cruiser, the aircraft carrier, the embarked air wing and staffs, anywhere between six and 7,000 people overall involved.

We prepare for a range of threats, some of the most high end threats, to some of the threats that are currently in existence that we have dealt with over the past 10 to 20 years. So you create a range of a threat so you could be deployed to any theater – 7th Fleet in the Western Pacific, or in the Middle East. I think we got sufficient training in that process, because there was a lot of variety. We were evaluated. We did well, but you never know what to expect, right? In every single conflict I’ve been involved in, there was always a learning experience that had to happen. After day one, you start to look at, okay, what does the enemy have, and how are we going to counter it? We’re professionals. We sit down, we plan these things out. And if the plan doesn’t work, we debrief and we immediately change it, right? We have kind of this rapid learning process.

We also had organizations back home, technical organizations, part of the Navy, that could say, “Hey, you need to use this tactic or this technique or this procedure, and it will help.” So you have tremendous support stateside to feed us information. So learning was constantly happening, and it was very effective. So I can’t really say that we were surprised by anything. It’s the expectation in our culture that you will see things that you didn’t expect, and then you do something about it.

NT: You mentioned that the leadership of this strike group has 25 to 35 years experience, and yet you’d never seen anything like this kind of conflict. What was that learning curve like, and how did you adapt as the deployment went on to some of these threats?

Hill: We had all been involved in other combat operations, right? For me, for example, flying the E-2 Hawkeye, I was used to doing command and control – both in training, in combat – of running the air battle, right? So that was kind of intuitive for all of us. So in that sense, there was no, no surprise, right? It was easily adaptable for us. One of the things we had to look at, though, was how is this going to impact the crew, being in this environment? So a lot of questions came our way. How is the crew doing? What are you doing for the crew? And it became an item that we talked about with media locally.

I would say things like, “Hey, the crew is doing great.” And occasionally I’d have a sailor that would come up to me say, “Sir, I don’t agree with you. I’m not doing great.” That’s partly because we’ve all been on short and long deployments. Even if you’re not doing combat, being at sea in an austere environment like the Red Sea, where it’s hot, the water’s hot, so the engines aren’t as efficient. It impacts your quality of life. And this is a known thing by sailors going back centuries. It is a tough life by itself.

Now you add the complexity of warfare, I would say the warfare element was inspiring to many. And I talked about that – we felt like we had mission and purpose. We were actually doing something to make a difference in the world. We were affecting the enemy. We were showing American resolve by being there, right?

You know, I would say to sailors, “What if America said, ‘You know, we don’t care. We’re not going to show up.’” That’s not what we do with the United States Navy – we care about freedom and navigation as part of our core mission going back to 1775, right? So, a lot of discussion about that throughout the ship to remind the sailors that they were really contributing to something significant, and also mentioned the fact that, “Hey, what is going on is unprecedented for the U.S. Navy at least in modern history going back 70 years.” That was what contributed to morale in the positive. It might have been the one thing that sustained us through an extended deployment in the aggregate.

So we’re looking at all these things as we’re evaluating how we did, what we could have done better – there’s always room for improvement on any deployment. But that was a big takeaway: the mission and purpose matters. And how do you measure it? How do you measure morale? I joked back in the day that I can measure morale by counting smiles.

But it’s really hard to quantify. You can get it through feedback from sailors, so you have to now elicit feedback. I would bring sailors in this very room right here, 10 to 15 sailors a couple times a week. Through over the past almost year-and-a-half now, I have seen more than 2,700 sailors come through this room. We talked about morale, how the morale was, what we could do better – listening to sailors try to get that feedback. And then explaining my philosophy, and I had expectations for them. They were required to love and value each other. And I realize sometimes, if everybody’s your brother and sister, that doesn’t mean you actually get along with them every time. But the expectation is they are your brother and sister, so you still love and value them, right? And at the end of the day, if someone’s going after them or they’re getting attacked, you’re going to jump in front of that system. That’s the kind of environment we wanted to create – that’s sort of like the warrior mindset or warrior ethos.

NT: Speaking of morale, I understand that the ship had Wi-Fi during this deployment and I wanted to ask how that contributed to morale and also combatting disinformation.

Hill: Wi-Fi is a game changer here, right? And I realize that there are operational security concerns, there’s times when you have to turn it off. It could expose you to hacking and all these other things that we worry about, and we have plans in place to mitigate that stuff. But as a human person, when you’re having a tough day, who do you call? Right? Do you call mom and dad? Do you call your spouse? Everybody has their call person.

Sometimes the connectivity doesn’t work. We had some connectivity issues with Wi-Fi. When you have 5,000 people trying to get on a system with only a handful of satellites to connect to, it was a challenge, but I’d like to see the Navy continue this process in a very careful, measured way to provide those resources to sailors so you can allow them to connect to their external support networks. That might be the thing that gets them through a tough day. We all have tough days. This is normal human behavior, right? What is the thing that can get them through? If Wi-Fi is a conduit for that, then let’s invest in this, right? The technology exists now. It’s less expensive than it was, say, 10 years ago. Let’s take advantage of it.

Also, the Wi-Fi opened up an opportunity to get into a little bit of more social media, right? So I was never a social media guy. I was always wary of it. I’m not the kind of person that likes to show pictures of myself, and very reserved in that sense. But I decided to take a risk, working with my public affairs officer, I said, “Why don’t we use one of the social media sites, and I’ll actually talk about my leadership philosophy or something like that.” But it actually took off in a weird way. Parents got involved because they’re worried about their sailors, right? Just like my mom was. And so I would get hundreds and hundreds of requests to see pictures of their sailors, and I couldn’t keep up with it. I didn’t have enough time in the day for something like that. But every day, I would try to bring up one sailor and show them off to the world, and just show the world that these are normal, ordinary young folks doing extraordinary things, and some people found some beauty in that, and so we just kept it going, right? Also, I gave them a cookie.

22-yr old cryptologic technician technical from Euless, TX was requested to the bridge by her uncle. She works in intelligence and anti-ship missile defense (how crazy is that?!). How did she survive 9 months of deployment?
Gym and jujitsu! Her advice to others: “Find peace in… pic.twitter.com/bMkWzIYdwW

— Chowdah Hill (@ChowdahHill) August 25, 2024

I’m not trying to recruit for the U.S. Navy by any means, but maybe I’m recruiting the parents so that they can convince their children that it’s an environment where it could be enriching and could change their lives. Which I do get to see all the time as a leader of a ship, right? We as leaders, we see this, and this is what kind of motivates us to continue on, like a school teacher. Seeing a student start, mature, and get better in class – it’s motivating for a school teacher.

Someone had said in the media that this social media was sort of an information warfare campaign of some sort. It was not intended to be that way. If it just so happened that the enemy claimed they sunk the ship – which they made several claims, but they didn’t touch us – I could show a picture of the flight deck and show life as normal. I could show we’re baking cookies. Capt. Demo, our facility dog, is walking around the ship just like a normal day, which was all true, right? So if you want to call that information warfare, have at it.

NT: I know the carrier air wing was incredibly active during this deployment, and led the first strikes against Houthi facilities in Yemen. And then they also fired off several weapons in combat for the first time. So what was the decision-making process like between you and the CAW, and what was it like to employ these weapons and conduct these strikes?

Hill: In terms of striking, it’s an interesting process, and you have to bring in our intelligence specialists and their leadership that actually tries to find the targets, and then you have to vet it. And that vetting process, depending on what theater you’re in or the intensity of the war, typically goes up a chain of command off ship. And they could say, “Yes, we approve that target,” and then we will do the weaponeering. So we have people that are experts on that, and that’s usually coming from the air wing. So they’re saying, “Okay, for this target, we need this type of weapon, missile or bomb.” You want to minimize collateral damage. You don’t want to escalate the problem, right?

We’re very, very careful about that. This isn’t World War II, right? And plus, we don’t want to expend and waste things that are not going to strike. Our weapons are extremely precise, and we want it to stay that way, right? Only target the stuff that needs to be targeted. And then, when that decision is made on the type of weapon, then they come to me, because I’m the holder of the weapons and I have two giant weapons magazines. The ability to fight a war long term – I can’t give you the amount of months, because it depends on the intensity of a given day – but I could have gone on indefinitely, probably a minimum of 10 more months, given the equipment I had. Maybe there would be an occasional reload of this or that, or the other type of missile, bomb. But extraordinary capability within an aircraft carrier with its embarked air wing to fight a battle.

All of our weapons have evolved over time. This was the first time we’ve seen ballistic missiles shot in combat. First time they’ve been shot down by our ships. So that’s different. We knew drones were coming. We’ve been talking about this for decades, and now we saw them. So we had some foreshadowing with the Carney, and so nothing was a shock to us, right? It was more, “Hey, this is interesting. Let’s do what we do and figure out a way to stop it.” And we were doing that regularly.

NT: What were some of the biggest challenges you faced during this deployment?

Hill: One of the things that I was challenged with was making sure people were getting the right amount of sleep so that they could perform well, that they had good reaction times. Mood matters to me, how you interact with other sailors, and a lot of that can get ruined if you’re not sleeping. And I would say, I don’t think the Navy historically has done a great job on sleep hygiene, but we’re getting better. So a lot of leaders are talking about it. We understand the value of sleep. So when you’re in actual combat, it’s quite frequent that you have to launch alert aircraft to go after a target or something, which we did many times, that might not fall into the window of our normal flight ops. So we’ll have a normal battle rhythm, anywhere between 10 to 14 hours per day, flying aircraft throughout the entire day. It’s cyclical, right?

But what about when we’re not there? If it’s a single carrier, we have to provide alerts at night, sometimes in the very early morning. The air wing as well, we had to make sure we very carefully monitor when people were actually sleeping and that that sleep occurred at a normal time. You can’t just say, “You can now do your eight hours of sleep right now.” You have to time it so that’s the time when they normally sleep. So creating the sleep battle rhythm that’s circadian friendly, that allows people to be alert and respond to any threat. So we did a little bit of adjustment on that, because we didn’t expect to do as many alert launches, and we did a lot.

NT: I know one thing the commanding officer of the Carney said after returning from deployment was that there were a lot of quick decisions that had to be made navigating this conflict in the Red Sea and the Middle East. Can you speak a little about that, and what that was like for the Eisenhower?

Hill: I would say the quick decisions were largely with the destroyers. Ballistic missiles were not a concern for me, because I had them as protection, right? But the response time is just seconds. They have to identify and make a decision quick. But we train our operators to make the decision without asking permission from the captain of the ship, who might be sleeping at that very moment or doing something else. Or he’s got a radio on him, and for whatever reason, it’s not working. It’s garbled. So our tactical action officers, the people that work in our combat cells on every ship, are trained to respond very quickly. Also our systems help you in that matter. Like these are pretty advanced algorithms of these systems. They can help you identify a threat, provide you with recommendations. So that makes the process easier, right? So very impressed with both the equipment we had, the missiles we had, and how the sailors performed. It was like a perfect nexus of all three.

NT: There were multiple extensions during this deployment. You guys were gone for a long period of time, and now there’s two carriers in the Middle East. In terms of pacing, how long do you think carriers can be engaged in this kind of conflict?

Hill: If you look at it isolated, we are capable of being engaged forever. Any ship is capable of going for years on end without returning home. We have that capability. We just don’t exercise it because it’s an all-volunteer force. We want to get people home, cycle other people in. Some need the experience in that environment, but that’s looking at things isolated. We also have other parts of the world where we want to be, so we have to carefully apportion where our carrier strike groups are, and manage that appropriately. So that’s stuff that we think about and talk about all the time on our end.

NT: What do you hope sailors take away from this deployment, as they look back on it?

Hill: When they’re 80 years old and they have their walker, maybe they’re on an oxygen tank that they say, “You know what? I was on the Ike.” And telling the stories to their grandchildren, who are probably rolling their eyes. “And I was proud to be on the Ike. It was tough, but we did a great job against the enemy.” Right? And I want them to have that veteran experience where there’s some pride in what they accomplished. You don’t always see that in American history, right? But I hope that that happens many decades from now.

NT: What’s it been like for the crew since returning from deployment, and what are the next steps for the ship?

Hill: So coming back, most sailors are doing just fine. Some said it was weird coming home – nine months away from families. For some it was lonely, because they don’t have families to go to, so they weren’t around their peers all day long because their peers went home, right? We always monitor that. We want to make sure everybody’s good. So there’s a big effort to keep track of that situation and talk about it. So I talked about it through several times. Like, what you’re experiencing is absolutely normal. If it’s too hard to handle, then you can go seek help, and we have those resources, as I talked about, but it hasn’t been anything unusual in terms of post-deployment behavior, if you will. I haven’t seen anything unusual, and I’ve done many different deployments. And even for me, it’s like, it’s weird coming home and it takes a few weeks to readjust. And we got underway recently, we did a friends and family day, one day in and out, and kind of got back into our battle rhythm.

Then we did an ammo offload for about a week to get in our battle rhythm, restore mission and purpose. And so my main thing looking forward is, how do I provide mission and purpose if we’re not at sea doing that mission, right? So our new mission is to upgrade the ship in a shipyard period, and this is based on the life cycle of ship…so that we can make the ship even better for follow-on deployments. And there’s probably a couple more deployments left in the ship’s life.

NT: How will you remember this deployment?

Hill: I might remember the fact that during some engagements, I was wearing my pajamas and my Adidas slides, and I think I’m old enough where I think I’ve earned the right to do that every now and then. People may disagree with me on that, and I’m probably indicting myself, but there were times where, you know, just not enough time to slap on a uniform or take a shower, right? We had to do work.

While civilian Defense Department employees like Del Toro are permitted to publicly back political candidates in a personal capacity, the Hatch Act bars federal officials from participating in political activities while serving in their official capacity and in their federal workplace.

The Office of Special Counsel said Thursday that Del Toro breached this policy during several interviews representing the Defense Department to garner backing for Operation Prosperity Guardian, a U.S. and international mission to safeguard shipping vessels in the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden.

“When speaking in his official capacity on a taxpayer-funded trip, Secretary Del Toro encouraged electoral support for one candidate over another in the upcoming presidential election,” Special Counsel Hampton Dellinger said in a statement Thursday. “By doing so, he crossed a legal line and violated the Hatch Act.”

“This is especially troubling because Secretary Del Toro has himself acknowledged that military work and partisan politics should not be mixed,” Dellinger said. “As he stated just this past July: ‘It is more important than ever for us to remember that the [Department of the Navy] is an apolitical body… Public trust and confidence depend on this.’”

During an appearance at the Royal United Services Institute on Jan. 25, Del Toro fielded a question regarding concerns the U.S. could adopt a more isolationist approach in the event of a different administration following the 2024 election. In response, Del Toro said that the U.S. and the world “need the mature leadership of President Biden.”

“I’m confident that the American people will step up to the plate come November and support President Biden for a second term as our Commander-in Chief, so that we can continue to work together as free democratic countries respect each other around the globe,” Del Toro said.

Later that day, Del Toro made similar remarks about the world deserving a second term with Biden in the White House in an interview with BBC News Sunday.

Del Toro self-reported his comments on BBC News Sunday on Feb. 1, noting that he aimed to address the significance of strong international alliances and national security issues.

“In retrospect, I believe my response should have been delivered more broadly without reference to specific candidates,” Del Toro wrote.

After opening an inquiry into the incident, the Office of Special Counsel later learned of Del Toro’s remarks at the Royal United Services Institute.

Del Toro’s lawyer defended these statements, pointing out they were not included in prepared remarks, were “fragments of answers” provided in response to questions from foreign press, and that Del Toro had no intent to influence the election. Del Toro’s attorney also said that failing to answer questions from the BBC’s Laura Kuennsberg could have also portrayed a bad image and indicated a lack of support for the current administration.

“Failing to be responsive may well have suggested to her — and the BBC audience — that Secretary Del Toro was not fully supportive of the US President. That could well have proved embarrassing on the international stage to Secretary Del Toro, President Biden, and the Biden Administration,” Del Toro’s attorney, Michael Bromwich, said in a letter to the Office of Special Counsel.

Still, the Office of Special Counsel said that self-reporting the comments on BBC did not “absolve” Del Toro from misconduct and that he did back a second Biden term in the White House.

“Secretary Del Toro’s statements with overt reference to the election conveyed electoral support for one candidate and opposition to another candidate, and thus, constituted political activity,” the Office of Special Counsel said in their report on the matter.

As a result, the Office of Special Counsel referred the matter to the White House for further appropriate action. Penalties for violating the Hatch Act include removal from service, reduction in grade, a reprimand, or a civil penalty up to $1,000.

Pentagon Pentagon Spokesperson Sabrina Singh told reporters Thursday that the Defense Department is aware of the Office of Special Counsel’s report, and noted that Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks approved a memo this year outlining political engagement processes for military and civilian Defense Department personnel.

Ahead of the presidential election in November, Del Toro released guidance in July instructing commanding officers to review limitations on political activities with their sailors, since the Department of the Navy is an “apolitical body.”

Banned activities for active duty sailors include attending partisan political events as a service member, writing partisan political articles or letters that attempt to sway votes for a candidate or cause, and speaking before a partisan political gathering.

In addition to delivering two Naval Strike Missiles for the Corps’ anti-ship missile system, the autonomous low-profile vessel the Marine Corps is experimenting with also aims to better get critical supplies like food to forward deployed and distributed Marines, Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Simon Doran said at the Defense News Conference on Wednesday.

“Truth be told, this is just a narco-boat,” Doran said. “We stole the idea from friends down south. And so this is 55 feet long, completely autonomous. It’s able to go hundreds or thousands of miles. It’s able to carry weapon systems that we have that are new. … It can carry pretty much anything you want to put in it.”

Inspired by narco-boats, which are used by traffickers to smuggle illicit substances across bodies of water, the unmanned vessel remains close to the water-surface level to cut down on the likelihood of detection as it assists with logistics capabilities.

The service tested the logistics supply drone at the Army’s Project Convergence Capstone in February at Camp Pendleton, California, where the Marine Corps trained a cook in 21 days to operate the system off the islands of Japan.

The Army spearheads the Project Convergence to test out advanced technology and capabilities in modern warfare as part of a joint, multinational exercise.

The autonomous low-profile vessel is particularly important because it allows forces to resupply food, fuel and ammunition without jeopardizing the safety of Marines, Doran said.

“If you have that unit located inside a weapons engagement zone, contested logistics and the ability to maneuver in the littorals becomes key,” Doran said. “And for that, what we’re looking at is trying to acquire systems that we deem risk worthy, meaning that we don’t necessarily want to just waste them, but we’d rather put something in there that’s autonomous, that doesn’t have humans on it that can do some of these higher risk missions without having personnel put in that riskier situation.”

This system is something the Marine Corps wanted “yesterday,” but testing is ongoing, Doran said. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory received two prototypes in 2023.

The vessel is expected to join the III Marine Expeditionary Force based in Okinawa, Japan, for further evaluation this fall, he said.

The service hopes to purchase the vessels in the next several years, Marine Corps leaders said at the 2023 Defense News Conference.

For a variety of reasons, including operational security, a crew’s internet access is regularly restricted while underway, to preserve bandwidth for the mission and to keep their ship safe from nefarious online attacks.

But the senior enlisted leaders among the littoral combat ship Manchester’s gold crew knew no such privation last year, when they installed and secretly used their very own Wi-Fi network during a deployment, according to a scathing internal investigation obtained by Navy Times.

As the ship prepared for a West Pacific deployment in April 2023, the enlisted leader onboard conspired with the ship’s chiefs to install the secret, unauthorized network aboard the ship, for use exclusively by them.

So while rank-and-file sailors lived without the level of internet connectivity they enjoyed ashore, the chiefs installed a Starlink satellite internet dish on the top of the ship and used a Wi-Fi network they dubbed “STINKY” to check sports scores, text home and stream movies.

The enjoyment of those wireless creature comforts by enlisted leaders aboard the ship carried serious repercussions for the security of the ship and its crew.

“The danger such systems pose to the crew, the ship and the Navy cannot be understated,” the investigation notes.

Led by the senior enlisted leader of the ship’s gold crew, then-Command Senior Chief Grisel Marrero, the effort roped in the entire chiefs mess by the time it was uncovered a few months later.

Marrero was relieved in late 2023 after repeatedly misleading and lying to her ship’s command about the Wi-Fi network, and she was convicted at court-martial this spring in connection to the scheme.

She was sentenced to a reduction in rank to E-7 after the trial and did not respond to requests for comment for this report.

The Navy has yet to release the entirety of the Manchester investigation file to Navy Times, including supplemental enclosures. Such records generally include statements or interview transcripts with the accused.

But records released so far show the probe, which wrapped in November, found that the entire chiefs mess knew about the secret system, and those who didn’t buy into it were nonetheless culpable for not reporting the misconduct.

Those chiefs and senior chiefs who used, paid for, helped hide or knew about the system were given administrative nonjudicial punishment at commodore’s mast, according to the investigation.

All told, more than 15 Manchester chiefs were in cahoots with Marrero to purchase, install and use the Starlink system aboard the ship.

“This agreement was a criminal conspiracy, supported by the overt act of bringing the purchased Starlink onboard USS MANCHESTER,” the investigation said. “Any new member of the CPO Mess which then paid into the services joined that conspiracy following the system’s operational status.”

Records obtained by Navy Times via a Freedom of Information Act request reveal a months-long effort by Marrero to obtain, install and then conceal the chiefs Wi-Fi network from superiors, including the covert installation of a Starlink satellite dish on the outside of the Manchester.

When superiors became suspicious about the existence of the network and confronted her about it, Marrero failed to come clean on multiple occasions and provided falsified documents to further mislead Manchester’s commanding officer, the investigation states.

Unauthorized Wi-Fi systems like the one Marrero set up are a massive no-no for a deployed Navy ship, and Marrero’s crime occurred as the ship was deploying to the West Pacific, where such security concerns become even more paramount among heightened tensions with the Chinese.

“The installation and usage of Starlink, without the approval of higher headquarters, poses a serious risk to mission, operational security, and information security,” the investigation states.

‘Deep manipulation’ and ‘corrupt dealings’

Marrero’s background is in Navy intelligence, and she earned a master’s degree in business administration with a concentration in information security and digital management, according to her biography.

The investigation notes that she should have known better.

“Her time in service and specialized training makes it clear the member knew or should have known the risks associated with an unauthorized Wi-Fi system,” the investigation states.

No officers aboard the Manchester had access to the unauthorized network, nor did any lower-ranking sailors, according to the investigation.

“The deep level of manipulation is only overshadowed by the level of corrupt dealings in which CMC Marrero used to conceal the system,” the investigation found.

While Marrero claimed the Wi-Fi system was secretly installed for morale purposes, the investigation notes that such a claim “is undermined by the selective availability of the Wi-Fi and strict control of its access to the CPO Mess only.”

The Manchester’s secret Wi-Fi network was born in March 2023, when Marrero and a co-conspirator got to work buying and installing the Starlink system before the ship’s deployment began the following month.

The Starlink dish was installed on the Manchster’s O-5 level weatherdeck during a “blanket” aloft period, which requires a sailor to hang high above or over the side of the ship.

During a “blanket” aloft, duties are not documented in the deck logs or the officer of the deck logs, according to the investigation.

It’s unclear who harnessed up and actually installed the system for Marrero due to redactions in the publicly released copy of the probe, but records show Marrero powered up the system the night before the ship got underway to the West Pacific waters of U.S. 7th Fleet.

Marrero and her cohorts paid $2,800 for a Starlink High Performance Kit with a personal credit card, and contacted Starlink to expedite shipping so the system would arrive in time for the deployment.

Starlink offers plans ranging from $90 to $5,000 a month, and allows users to control network settings via a cell phone app. The Navy is installing such authorized capabilities aboard some ships in the fleet.

That was not the case aboard Manchester, where Marrero set up payment plans for the chief’s mess to pay for the system — either $62.50 a month or a one-time fee of $375 — that the ship’s Chief Petty Officer Association treasurer collected into a chiefs mess checking account.

Those involved also used the Chief Petty Officer Association’s debit card to pay off the $1,000 monthly Starlink bill, and Marrero warned the chiefs to only use the network in their rooms.

Marrero served as the gatekeeper of the system, records show, downloading and maintaining the Starlink app from her phone and naming it “STINKY.”

Only she could add others to the network, and would directly type the password into their devices, according to the investigation.

After Manchester got underway from San Diego, Marrero and the chiefs soon realized the Wi-Fi signal didn’t cover all areas of the ship, so the senior chief purchased signal repeaters and cable at the Navy Exchange store in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, during a port visit in late April or early May, according to the investigation.

A ‘STINKY’ network

Little stays secret within the close quarters of a deployed ship, and shortly after getting underway, scuttlebutt started swirling among some sailors about the unauthorized Wi-Fi network, the investigation states.

The ship’s former executive officer, Cmdr. Matthew Yokeley, caught wind of the rumors in May and notified the commanding officer, Cmdr. Colleen Moore.

Moore confronted Marrero about whether the chief’s mess had an unauthorized Wi-Fi network that same month.

Another unidentified crew member approached Marrero about a Wi-Fi network aboard the ship after finding available networks on a device that started with the name “STINKY.” It’s unclear who found the “STINKY” network, due to redactions.

In both instances, Marrero denied that such a Wi-Fi network existed. But she soon changed the “STINKY” Wi-Fi network name to another moniker that looked like a wireless printer — even though no such general-use wireless printers were present on the ship, the investigation found.

Moore and Yokeley conducted an inspection inside the ship but did not find any evidence of an unauthorized Wi-Fi system. They did not check the exterior of the ship.

Separately, the Navy relieved Yokeley days later on May 19, 2023. The Navy has said his relief was unrelated to Marrero’s crimes.

About a month later, in the middle of June, the unidentified crew member again confronted Marrero again about the Wi-Fi network, because junior sailors suspected the password was being hidden from them.

Once more, Marrero denied such a network existed.

That same month, Marrero seized a comment placed in the CO’s suggestion box regarding the Wi-Fi network so that it wouldn’t end up in Moore’s hands, according to the investigation.

But Moore received another comment in the suggestion box about the network weeks later, in the middle of July, and again approached Marrero about the network. Again, Marrero denied its existence.

Moore and the ship’s acting executive officer, Cmdr. Samuel Moffett, then conducted another sweep inside the ship.

Although the network that appeared to be a wireless printer appeared on their personal devices during their search, neither made additional inquiries regarding that network, according to the investigation.

Moore told the crew during an all-hands call on July 14, 2023, that no covert Wi-Fi network existed aboard the ship.

While those interviewed claimed Marrero misled the chiefs mess into thinking Moore knew about the Wi-Fi system and had signed off on it, the investigating officer wrote that such statements “lack credibility,” given that only chiefs had access to the system and Marrero renamed the network at one point.

“Any reasonable Chief should have known that with those conditions, CMC Marrero’s assertions that the CO was aware and authorized the system was unreasonable,” the investigation states. “To think otherwise would mean they believed CDR Moore intentionally authorized a concealed Wi-Fi network only for the CPO Mess, excluding all others from usage.”

Weeks after the all-hands call, in August, Moore and Moffett conducted a third, internal inspection of the ship after an outgoing crew member claimed that a secret Wi-Fi network did exist.

‘The gig is up’

On August 18, a civilian from the Naval Information Warfare Center installing an authorized Starshield satellite communication system on the Manchester notified the officer of the deck of the chiefs mess Starlink satellite dish on the O-5 weatherdeck.

Marrero and the chief’s mess knew ahead of time that the Starshield installation near their secret Starlink dish could expose their Wi-Fi network, but they agreed to keep the dish installed, according to the investigation.

The Manchester’s combat systems officer soon took a photo of the dish, and then called in another unidentified crew member to the stateroom to ask if he or she had any knowledge of the dish. The crew member pointed the combat systems officer to Marrero, and then texted Marrero that the combat systems officer knew about the dish and had snapped a photo of it.

“The gig is up,” Marrero texted back, according to the investigation.

Marrero’s secret Starlink dish was removed the same day, and Marrero told another unidentified crew member the next day that it was authorized for in-port use — prompting sailors to re-install the illegal Starlink.

Moore learned about the Starlink dish on Aug. 24, six days after its discovery, during a conversation with the operations officer who had heard second-hand information about the presence of an unauthorized Wi-Fi network.

Moore called the combat systems officer into the stateroom to ask what they knew about the network. The combat systems officer admitted to learning about the system on Aug. 18, but said they didn’t tell Moore about it after discussions with mentors.

It’s unclear which mentors were consulted, due to redactions.

Later that day, Moore approached Marrero again about the dish and whether it belonged to the chief’s mess.

Marrero responded that she “she was not tracking” and told Moore she would hold a meeting with the chief’s mess.

During that chiefs mess meeting, Marrero told her fellow enlisted leaders that Moore knew about their secret Wi-Fi, and two chiefs subsequently removed the dish from the O-5 weatherdeck.

An unidentified chief also volunteered to take responsibility for the network.

The next day, an unidentified chief provided Moore with false statements regarding the installation of the dish, and who was responsible.

It’s unclear due to redactions if the chief was referring to themselves, or another chief. The chief also told Moore that they only used the connection while in port.

Moore remained skeptical, however, and told Marrero later she didn’t believe that.

To bolster their lie that the Wi-Fi was only used in port, Marrero and another chief altered Starlink data usage charts from the service’s website to make it look like the chiefs mess only used the Wi-Fi network in port.

“The actual, un-doctored billing cycle statements show usage while underway,” the investigation states.

Marrero then shared these fabricated charts with Moore, but Moore “did not trust the data usage charts as they appeared to be poorly doctored,” investigators wrote.

Marrero finally confessed and apologized to Moore on Aug. 26, copping to the fact that she deceived her CO throughout the entirety of the deployment.

An unidentified crew member removed the Starlink cable following that meeting, and Moore contacted leadership from Littoral Combat Ship Squadron 3 and Destroyer Squadron 7 to fill them in.

That same day, the chiefs mess also met with Moore and revealed their use of the unauthorized Wi-Fi network in port and at sea. Although Marrero initially attended the meeting, she exited after the chief’s mess requested she leave.

The chiefs handed the system over to Moffett the next day, after he and the ship’s legal officer requested they turn it over.

‘Egregious misconduct’

At a special court-martial in March, Marrero pleaded guilty to willful dereliction of duty charge specifications, Navy Times previously reported. She also pleaded guilty to two false official statement charge specifications that involved her telling the CO that there was no Wi-Fi aboard the Manchester, according to her trial summary.

Additionally, she pleaded not guilty to an obstruction of justice charge, but was found guilty at trial, according to the trial summary record.

Marrero failed to safeguard the Manchester against operational security risks when she set up the secret Wi-Fi, the charge sheet says.

Marrero’s “egregious misconduct” with the illegal Wi-Fi “cannot be understated,” the investigating officer wrote, particularly given how Moore needed her to step up following the relief of the ship’s second-in-command that summer.

“In a time period in which the CO relied extensively on [Marrero] to recover the Command’s climate in the wake of the XO relief, CMC Marrero willfully and intentionally concealed the presence of an unauthorized system,” the investigator wrote. “Following the relief of the previous XO, it is reasonable that the level of trust and confidence with CMC Marrero increased, with heavier reliance on her to pick up the slack left behind.”

Escalations stem from the recent killings of top leaders of Iran-backed militant groups Hamas and Hezbollah in suspected Israeli strikes, while U.S. forces experience continued attacks in Iraq and Syria that U.S. leaders attribute to militias supported by Iran.

As a result, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on Aug. 11 instructed the Abraham Lincoln, then operating in the Indo-Pacific en route to the Middle East, to expedite its arrival to the region.

Austin also ordered the guided-missile submarine Georgia to the CENTCOM region. Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters Tuesday the submarine would arrive there “soon.”

The Abraham Lincoln is outfitted with F-35C and F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets and will replace the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt that started operating in the Middle East in July.

The U.S. enhanced its presence in the Middle East after Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel and Israel’s subsequent retaliatory strikes in Gaza. Naval assets sent to the region in October included the aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower, marking the first time a U.S. aircraft carrier sailed in Middle Eastern waters since the end of the Afghanistan war in 2021.

The carrier, along with its accompanying destroyers Gravely and Mason and cruiser Philippine Sea, fended off routine attacks of Iran-backed Houthi drones and missiles targeting civilian commercial vessels in the Red Sea. The Eisenhower returned to Naval Station Norfolk in July, concluding a total of 275 days underway.

Meanwhile, Ryder declined Tuesday to provide specifics regarding how long he expects an enhanced presence of roughly 40,000 U.S. troops — up from 32,000 troops — will remain in the Middle East.

“We’ve had a significant force presence in the Middle East for a very long time. … I don’t foresee that changing anytime soon,” Ryder said.

Ryder also said 11 U.S. personnel were treated for traumatic brain injury and smoke inhalation following an attack Aug. 9 at the Rumalyn Landing Zone American base in Syria. Ryder previously told reporters eight troops experienced injuries after that attack.

“We’re not going to tolerate attacks on our forces, and we will always respond appropriately in a timely manner of our choosing,” Ryder said.